Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1928381
 
 

Citations



 


 



Efficiency Advantages of Grandfathering in Rights-Based Fisheries Management


Terry L. Anderson


PERC - Property and Environment Research Center

Ragnar Arnason


University of Iceland

Gary D. Libecap


University of California, Santa Barbara - Donald Bren School of Environmental Science & Management; University of Arizona - Karl Eller Center; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); PERC - Property and Environment Research Center

October 2011

Annual Review of Resource Economics, Vol. 3, Issue 1, pp. 159-179, 2011

Abstract:     
We show that grandfathering fishing rights to local users or recognizing first possessions is more dynamically efficient than auctions of such rights. It is often argued that auctions allocate rights to the highest-valued users and thereby maximize resource rents. We counter that rents are not fixed in situ but rather depend additionally upon the innovation, investment, and collective actions of fishers, who discover and enhance stocks and convert them into valuable goods and services. Our analysis shows how grandfathering increases rents by raising expected rates of return for investment, lowering the cost of capital, and providing incentives for collective action.

Accepted Paper Series


Not Available For Download

Date posted: September 16, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Anderson, Terry L. and Arnason, Ragnar and Libecap, Gary D., Efficiency Advantages of Grandfathering in Rights-Based Fisheries Management (October 2011). Annual Review of Resource Economics, Vol. 3, Issue 1, pp. 159-179, 2011. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1928381 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-resource-083110-120056

Contact Information

Terry L. Anderson (Contact Author)
PERC - Property and Environment Research Center ( email )
2048 Analysis Drive
Suite A
Bozeman, MT 59718
United States
Ragnar Arnason
University of Iceland ( email )
Iceland
Gary D. Libecap
University of California, Santa Barbara - Donald Bren School of Environmental Science & Management ( email )
4670 Physical Sciences North
Santa Barbara, CA 93106-5131
United States
805-893-8611 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.esm.ucsb.edu/people/usernew.asp?user=glibecap
University of Arizona - Karl Eller Center ( email )
McClelland Hall
Tucson, AZ 85721-0108
United States
520-621-4821 (Phone)
520-626-5269 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.bpa.arizona.edu/~libecap
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
PERC - Property and Environment Research Center
2048 Analysis Drive
Suite A
Bozeman, MT 59718
United States

Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 188

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.235 seconds