Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1930319
 
 

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Representation of Non-transferable Utility Games by Coalition Production Economies


Tomoki Inoue


Meiji University - School of Political Science and Economics

December 28, 2012


Abstract:     
We prove that every compactly generated non-transferable utility (NTU) game can be generated by a coalition production economy. The set of Walrasian payoff vectors for our induced coalition production economy coincides with the inner core of the balanced cover of the original game. This equivalence depends heavily on our representation. We exemplify that this equivalence need not hold in other representations. We also give a sufficient condition for the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium for our induced coalition production economy.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

Keywords: Inner core, coalition production economy, balancedness, Walrasian equilibrium

JEL Classification: D51, C71

working papers series





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Date posted: September 19, 2011 ; Last revised: December 28, 2012

Suggested Citation

Inoue, Tomoki, Representation of Non-transferable Utility Games by Coalition Production Economies (December 28, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1930319 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1930319

Contact Information

Tomoki Inoue (Contact Author)
Meiji University - School of Political Science and Economics ( email )
1-1 Kanda-Surugadai
Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 101-8301
Japan
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References:  26
Citations:  2

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