Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1930379
 
 

References (92)



 
 

Citations (4)



 


 



Flexibility in International Agreements


Laurence R. Helfer


Duke University School of Law

January 3, 2013

INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Jeffrey Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack, eds., Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 175-196

Abstract:     
This chapter is a contribution to the forthcoming edited volume INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: TAKING STOCK (Jeffrey Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., Cambridge University Press 2012). The chapter provides an overview of flexibility mechanisms in international agreements and the role of such mechanisms in promoting or inhibiting international cooperation. Part I reviews the many flexibility devices available to treaty makers. It divides these tools into two broad categories: formal mechanisms (such as reservations, escape clauses, and withdrawal provisions) and informal practices (such as auto-interpretation, nonparticipation, and noncompliance). Part II reviews the international law and international relations scholarship on the design and use of treaty flexibility mechanisms, focusing on studies of exit and escape clauses. Part III highlights several conclusions that emerge from the burgeoning literature on treaty flexibility and suggests avenues for future research.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: September 19, 2011 ; Last revised: February 1, 2013

Suggested Citation

Helfer, Laurence R., Flexibility in International Agreements (January 3, 2013). INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Jeffrey Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack, eds., Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 175-196. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1930379

Contact Information

Laurence R. Helfer (Contact Author)
Duke University School of Law ( email )
210 Science Dr.
Box 90360
Durham, NC 27708
United States
+1-919-613-8573 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://law.duke.edu/fac/helfer/
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 592
Downloads: 179
Download Rank: 93,759
References:  92
Citations:  4

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.437 seconds