Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1930885
 
 

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Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance


John Armour


University of Oxford - Faculty of Law; University of Oxford - Said Business School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Simon Deakin


University of Cambridge - Centre for Business Research (CBR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law

Suzanne J. Konzelmann


University of London - Birkbeck College - Faculty of Social Sciences, School of Management and Organizational Psychology; University of Cambridge - Faculty of Social and Political Sciences

June 1, 2003

Cambridge Centre for Business Research Working Paper No. 266

Abstract:     
Core institutions of UK corporate governance, in particular those relating to takeovers, board structure and directors’ duties, are strongly orientated towards a norm of shareholder primacy. Beyond the core, in particular at the intersection of insolvency and employment law, stakeholder interests are better represented, thanks to European Community influence. Moreover, institutional shareholders are redirecting their investment strategies away from a focus on short-term returns, in such a way as to favor stakeholder-inclusive practices. We therefore suggest that the UK system is currently in a state of flux and that the debate over shareholder primacy has not been concluded.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

Keywords: corporate governance, stakeholding, hostile takeovers, company law, insolvency, employee representation, shareholder activism

JEL Classification: D23, G32, G33, G34, K22, K31


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Date posted: September 20, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Armour, John and Deakin, Simon and Konzelmann, Suzanne J., Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance (June 1, 2003). Cambridge Centre for Business Research Working Paper No. 266. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1930885 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1930885

Contact Information

John Armour
University of Oxford - Faculty of Law ( email )
Oriel College
Oxford, OX1 4EW
United Kingdom
+44 1865 286544 (Phone)
University of Oxford - Said Business School ( email )
Park End Street
Oxford, OX1 1HP
Great Britain

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Simon F. Deakin
University of Cambridge - Centre for Business Research (CBR) ( email )
Top Floor, Judge Business School Building
Trumpington Street
Cambridge, CB2 1AG
United Kingdom
+ 44 1223 335243 (Phone)
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law ( email )
10 West Road
Cambridge, CB3 9DZ
United Kingdom

Suzanne J. Konzelmann (Contact Author)
University of London - Birkbeck College - Faculty of Social Sciences, School of Management and Organizational Psychology ( email )
Malet Street
Bloomsbury
London, WC1E 7HX
United Kingdom
+44 (0) 207 631 6799 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.bbk.ac.uk/management/our-staff/academics/konzelmann
University of Cambridge - Faculty of Social and Political Sciences ( email )
ESRC Centre for Business Research
Cambridge, CB2 1TN
United Kingdom
+44 1223 337733 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN


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References:  64
Citations:  22

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