Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1930891
 
 

References (31)



 


 



Politicians 'On Board'! Do Political Connections Affect Banking Activities in Italy?


Alessandro Carretta


University of Rome II - Faculty of Economics

Vincenzo Farina


University of Rome II - Faculty of Economics; University of Rome II - Department of Financial and Quantitative Economics

Abhishek Gon


affiliation not provided to SSRN

Antonio Parisi


affiliation not provided to SSRN

June 30, 2011


Abstract:     
This paper analyzes the effects of political presence in the boards of directors of cooperative banks. We refer our analysis to all politicians (almost 160.000) belonging to a political body in Italy. Overall, our dataset contains 1.858 board members referring to 127 cooperative banks.

Results show that politically connected banks, in which politicians have executive roles in the board of directors, display higher net interest revenues, lower quality of the loans portfolio and lower efficiency relative to a control group of non-connected counterparts.

Therefore, in the current debate on the reform of the statutes of the Italian cooperative banks, we argue that the problem is not for politicians to be in the boards but for them to hold executive positions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 27

Keywords: cooperative banks, politics, corporate governance

JEL Classification: G21, G34

working papers series





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Date posted: September 21, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Carretta, Alessandro and Farina, Vincenzo and Gon, Abhishek and Parisi, Antonio, Politicians 'On Board'! Do Political Connections Affect Banking Activities in Italy? (June 30, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1930891 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1930891

Contact Information

Alessandro Carretta
University of Rome II - Faculty of Economics ( email )
Via Columbia n.2
Rome, rome 00100
Italy
Vincenzo Farina (Contact Author)
University of Rome II - Faculty of Economics ( email )
Via Columbia n.2
Rome, rome 00100
Italy
+390672595433 (Phone)
+39062040219 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.economia.uniroma2.it/nuovo/facolta/docenti/docenti.asp?IdProfessore=285
University of Rome II - Department of Financial and Quantitative Economics ( email )
Via Columbia n.2
Roma, 00133
Italy
Abhishek Gon
affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )
Antonio Parisi
affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )
Feedback to SSRN


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