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Politicians 'On Board'! Do Political Connections Affect Banking Activities in Italy?Alessandro CarrettaUniversity of Rome II - Faculty of Economics Vincenzo FarinaUniversity of Rome II - Faculty of Economics; University of Rome II - Department of Financial and Quantitative Economics Abhishek Gonaffiliation not provided to SSRN Antonio Parisiaffiliation not provided to SSRN June 30, 2011 Abstract: This paper analyzes the effects of political presence in the boards of directors of cooperative banks. We refer our analysis to all politicians (almost 160.000) belonging to a political body in Italy. Overall, our dataset contains 1.858 board members referring to 127 cooperative banks. Results show that politically connected banks, in which politicians have executive roles in the board of directors, display higher net interest revenues, lower quality of the loans portfolio and lower efficiency relative to a control group of non-connected counterparts. Therefore, in the current debate on the reform of the statutes of the Italian cooperative banks, we argue that the problem is not for politicians to be in the boards but for them to hold executive positions.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 27 Keywords: cooperative banks, politics, corporate governance JEL Classification: G21, G34 working papers seriesDate posted: September 21, 2011Suggested CitationContact Information
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