Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1931007
 
 

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Did Lloyds/HBOS Mark the Failure of an Enduring Economics Based System of Merger Regulation?


Andreas Stephan


University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy

July 1, 2011

Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly, 2011

Abstract:     
UK Merger control is an example of regulation which has shifted from a public interest regime to an economics based system of competition assessment. This paper asks whether the merger of Lloyds TSB and HBOS in 2008, on public interest grounds, marked the failure of an enduring economics based system of merger regulation. It argues that far from marking a failure, the Lloyds TSB/HBOS merger highlights the importance of only allowing public interest interventions on exceptional grounds in specific industries. Economics based merger control is transparent and preferable to general public interest assessments, which are unpredictable and open to abuse.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 16

Keywords: Mergers, Public Interest, Financial Crisis, Lloyds TSB, HBOS

JEL Classification: K21, G21, G33, G34

working papers series


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Date posted: September 20, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Stephan, Andreas, Did Lloyds/HBOS Mark the Failure of an Enduring Economics Based System of Merger Regulation? (July 1, 2011). Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly, 2011. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1931007 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1931007

Contact Information

Andreas Stephan (Contact Author)
University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy ( email )
UEA
Norwich, Norfolk NR4 7TJ
United Kingdom
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