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On the Efficiency of Partial Information in Elections

Jon X. Eguia

Michigan State University - Department of Economics; Univ. of Bristol

Antonio Nicolo

University of Manchester

November 26, 2012

We study the relation between the electorate's information about candidates' policy platforms during an election, and the subsequent provision of inefficient local public goods by the elected government. More information does not always lead to better outcomes. We show that the equilibrium outcome is efficient if voters are partially uninformed; whereas, if the electorate is very well informed, electoral competition leads candidates to provide inefficient local public goods in all equilibria.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 47

Keywords: Elections, information, inefficiency, pork, local public goods, campaigns.

JEL Classification: D72, D61, D82, H41

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Date posted: September 21, 2011 ; Last revised: November 26, 2012

Suggested Citation

Eguia, Jon X. and Nicolo, Antonio, On the Efficiency of Partial Information in Elections (November 26, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1931040 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1931040

Contact Information

Jon X. Eguia (Contact Author)
Michigan State University - Department of Economics ( email )
East Lansing, MI 48824
United States
Univ. of Bristol ( email )
8 Woodland Road
School of Economics, Finance and Management.
Bristol, BS8 1TN
United Kingdom
+44 (0) 117 928 8419 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.bristol.ac.uk/economics/people/jon-x-eguia
Antonio Nicolo
University of Manchester ( email )
Arthur Lewis Building
Oxford Road
Manchester, M13 9PL
United Kingdom
Feedback to SSRN

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