On the Efficiency of Partial Information in Elections
Jon X. Eguia
Michigan State University - Department of Economics; University of Bristol - Department of Economics
University of Manchester
We study the relation between the electorate's information about candidates' policy platforms during an election, and the subsequent provision of inefficient local public goods by the elected government. More information does not always lead to better outcomes. We show that the equilibrium outcome is efficient if voters are partially uninformed; whereas, if the electorate is very well informed, electoral competition leads candidates to provide inefficient local public goods in all equilibria.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 42
Keywords: Elections, information, inefficiency, pork, local public goods, campaigns.
JEL Classification: D72, D61, D82, H41
Date posted: September 21, 2011 ; Last revised: March 23, 2015
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