Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1931884
 
 

Citations



 


 



Enforcement and Disclosure under Regulation FD: An Empirical Analysis


Paul A. Griffin


University of California, Davis - Graduate School of Management

David H. Lont


University of Otago - Department of Accountancy and Finance

Benjamin Segal


INSEAD - Accounting & Control Area

September 21, 2011

Accounting & Finance, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
While Regulation FD was designed to benefit investors by curbing the selective disclosure of material non-public information to “covered” investors, such as analysts and institutional investors, it can also impose costs. This paper finds that FD levies three kinds of enforcement and disclosure costs. First, investors cannot recover as part of an SEC enforcement action the gains to covered investors from their alleged use of the non-public information. Second, investors lose because the market responds negatively to an SEC enforcement announcement. Third, investors suffer because some companies post their FD filings well after the due date, without earlier public disclosure.

Keywords: Regulation FD, Enforcement Action, Untimely FD Disclosure, Late SEC Filing, Event Study

JEL Classification: G14, K22, M41

Accepted Paper Series


Not Available For Download

Date posted: September 23, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Griffin, Paul A. and Lont, David H. and Segal, Benjamin, Enforcement and Disclosure under Regulation FD: An Empirical Analysis (September 21, 2011). Accounting & Finance, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1931884

Contact Information

Paul A. Griffin
University of California, Davis - Graduate School of Management ( email )
3102 Gallahger Hall
Davis, CA 95616
United States
(530) 752-7372 (Phone)
(425) 799-4143 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.gsm.ucdavis.edu/griffin/

David H. Lont (Contact Author)
University of Otago - Department of Accountancy and Finance ( email )
Box 56
Dunedin, Otago 9054
New Zealand
+64 3 479 8119 (Phone)
+64 3 479 8171 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.business.otago.ac.nz/acty/
Benjamin Segal
INSEAD - Accounting & Control Area ( email )
Boulevard de Constance
77305 Fontainebleau Cedex
France
+33 1 64 69 44 68 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 780

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.328 seconds