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Opportunities to Divert, Firm Value, and Taxation: Theory and Evidence from European FirmsRobert KrämerGoethe University Frankfurt - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration Vilen LipatovGoethe University Frankfurt - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration; University of Siegen - Department of Economics August 12, 2011 Abstract: We study the relationship between opportunities for managerial diversion, corporate tax system parameters and the return on shareholder funds. Theoretically, in a simple game between corporate insiders and outsiders, higher costs of diversion increase the return. European firm-level data lend support to these results. Further, in civil law countries an increase in the corporate tax rate has a positive impact on shareholder value, whereas in common law countries the corporate tax negatively affects shareholder value.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 38 Keywords: corporate governance, corporate taxation JEL Classification: G3, H25, H26 working papers seriesDate posted: September 23, 2011Suggested CitationContact Information
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