Abstract

 


 



The Structure of Collective Bargaining and Worker Representation: Change and Persistence in the German Model


John T. Addison


University of South Carolina - Moore School of Business - Department of Economics; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Paulino Teixeira


Universidade de Coimbra - Faculdade de Economia; Center for European Economic Research (ZEW)

Alex Bryson


National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR); London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)

Andre Pahnke


Government of the Federal Republic of Germany - Institute for Employment Research (IAB)


IZA Discussion Paper No. 5987

Abstract:     
This paper depicts and examines the decline in collective bargaining coverage in Germany. Using repeat cross-section and longitudinal data from the IAB Establishment Panel, we show the overwhelming importance of behavioral as opposed to compositional change and, for the first time, document workplace transitions into and out of collective agreements via survival analysis. We provide estimates of the median duration of coverage, and report that the factors generating entry and exit are distinct and symmetric.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 38

Keywords: sectoral and firm agreements, changes in collective bargaining/works council coverage, shift-share analysis, bargaining transitions, survivability

JEL Classification: J50, J53

working papers series


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Date posted: September 25, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Addison, John T., Teixeira, Paulino, Bryson, Alex and Pahnke, Andre, The Structure of Collective Bargaining and Worker Representation: Change and Persistence in the German Model. IZA Discussion Paper No. 5987. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1933344

Contact Information

John T. Addison (Contact Author)
University of South Carolina - Moore School of Business - Department of Economics ( email )
The Francis M. Hipp Building
1705 College Street
Columbia, SC 29208
United States
803-777-7400 (Phone)
803-777-6876 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://mooreschool.sc.edu/moore/economics/profiles/addison.htm
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
Paulino Teixeira
Universidade de Coimbra - Faculdade de Economia ( email )
Av. Dias da Silva, 165
Coimbra, 3004-512
Portugal
Center for European Economic Research (ZEW) ( email )
P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1 D-68161 Mannheim
Germany
Alex Bryson
National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) ( email )
2 Dean Trench Street
Smith Square
London, SW1P 3HE
United Kingdom
HOME PAGE: http://www.niesr.ac.uk/staff/staffdetail.php?StaffID=307
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) ( email )
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
020 7955 6957 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/people/bio.asp?id=3818
Andre Pahnke
Government of the Federal Republic of Germany - Institute for Employment Research (IAB) ( email )
Regensburger Str. 104
Nuremberg, 90478
Germany
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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