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Abuse of Collective Dominance Under the Competition Law of the Russian Federation


Svetlana Avdasheva


National Research University Higher School of Economics

Nadezhda Goreyko


National Research University Higher School of Economics

Russell W. Pittman


U.S. Department of Justice - Economic Analysis Group; New Economic School (NES)

September 22, 2011


Abstract:     
In 2006, Russia amended its competition law and added the concepts of “collective dominance” and its abuse. This was seen as an attempt to address the common problem of “conscious parallelism” among firms in concentrated industries. Critics feared that the enforcement of this provision would become tantamount to government regulation of prices. In this paper we examine the enforcement experience to date, looking especially closely at sanctions imposed on firms in the oil industry. Some difficulties and complications experienced in enforcement are analyzed, and some alternative strategies for addressing anticompetitive behavior in concentrated industries discussed.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 33

Keywords: competition law, collective dominance, abuse of dominance, conscious parallelism, tacit collusion, Russian Federation

JEL Classification: D43, K21, L41

working papers series





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Date posted: September 29, 2011 ; Last revised: December 23, 2011

Suggested Citation

Avdasheva, Svetlana and Goreyko, Nadezhda and Pittman, Russell W., Abuse of Collective Dominance Under the Competition Law of the Russian Federation (September 22, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1933942 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1933942

Contact Information

Svetlana Avdasheva
National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )
Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia
HOME PAGE: http://www.hse.ru/
Nadezhda Goreyko
National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )
Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia

Russell Pittman (Contact Author)
U.S. Department of Justice - Economic Analysis Group ( email )
450 5th St. NW
Antitrust Division
Washington, DC 20530
United States
202-307-6367 (Phone)
202-307-3372 (Fax)
New Economic School (NES) ( email )
47 Nakhimovsky Prospekt
Moscow, 117418
Russia
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