Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1934136
 
 

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The European Road Pricing Game: How to Enforce Optimal Pricing in High-Transit Countries Under Asymmetric Information


Saskia Van Der Loo


Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. KUL. Faculty of Business and Economics

Stef Proost


KU Leuven - Department of Economics

September 27, 2011


Abstract:     
A federal government tries to force local governments to implement welfare optimal tolling and investment. Welfare optimal tolling requires charging for marginal external costs. Local governments have an incentive to charge more than the marginal social cost whenever there is transit traffic. We analyze the pricing and investment issue in an asymmetric information setting where the local governments have better information than the federal government. The case of air pollution and of congestion are discussed.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 33

Keywords: road pricing, federalism, asymmetric information, implementation congestion pricing

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Date posted: March 27, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Van Der Loo, Saskia and Proost, Stef, The European Road Pricing Game: How to Enforce Optimal Pricing in High-Transit Countries Under Asymmetric Information (September 27, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1934136 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1934136

Contact Information

Saskia Van Der Loo (Contact Author)
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. KUL. Faculty of Business and Economics ( email )
Naamsestraat 69
Leuven, B-3000
Belgium
Stef Proost
KU Leuven - Department of Economics ( email )
Leuven, B-3000
Belgium
016 32 66 35 (Phone)
016 32 67 96 (Fax)
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