Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1934737
 
 

References (48)



 
 

Citations (1)



 


 



An End to Consensus? The Selective Impact of Corporate Law Reform on Financial Development


Simon Deakin


University of Cambridge - Centre for Business Research (CBR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law

Prabirjit Sarkar


Jadavpur University

Ajit Singh


University of Cambridge

September 1, 2011

University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 40/2011
ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 182/2011

Abstract:     
Legal origins theory suggests that law reform should have a causal impact on financial development. We use recently created datasets measuring legal change over time in a sample of 25 developing, developed and transition countries to test this claim. We find that increases in shareholder protection contribute to stock market growth in the common law world and in developing countries, but not in the civil law world. We also find evidence of reverse causation, with financial development triggering legal changes in the developing world. We consider a number of reasons for the selective impact of law reform, focusing on the endogeneity of the legal system to its economic context, and on resulting complementarities between legal and financial institutions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 33

Keywords: legal origins, company law, shareholder rights, creditor rights, financial development

JEL Classification: G33, G34, K22, O16

working papers series





Download This Paper

Date posted: September 28, 2011 ; Last revised: November 10, 2011

Suggested Citation

Deakin, Simon and Sarkar, Prabirjit and Singh, Ajit, An End to Consensus? The Selective Impact of Corporate Law Reform on Financial Development (September 1, 2011). University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 40/2011; ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 182/2011. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1934737 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1934737

Contact Information

Simon F. Deakin (Contact Author)
University of Cambridge - Centre for Business Research (CBR) ( email )
Top Floor, Judge Business School Building
Trumpington Street
Cambridge, CB2 1AG
United Kingdom
+ 44 1223 335243 (Phone)
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law ( email )
10 West Road
Cambridge, CB3 9DZ
United Kingdom

Prabirjit Sarkar
Jadavpur University ( email )
Economics Department
Calcutta, 700032
India
HOME PAGE: http://prabirjit.blogspot.com/
Ajit Singh
University of Cambridge ( email )
Austin Robinson Building
Sidgwick Avenue
Cambridge, CB3 9DD
United Kingdom
+ 44 1223 350434 (Phone)
+ 44 1223 740479 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 714
Downloads: 180
Download Rank: 98,876
References:  48
Citations:  1

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.359 seconds