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Market Signaling of Personal CharacteristicsGertrud M. FremlingPh.D. in Economics, University of California at Lo Richard A. PosnerUniversity of Chicago Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) November 1999 University of Chicago Law School, John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 87 Abstract: The literature on signaling emphasizes signaling by business firms and also signaling by individuals by means of gifts or consumption. But it has rarely considered signaling by individuals by means of market behavior such as buying and selling. This paper seeks to fill this gap in the literature. It presents a model of such signaling, emphasizing the distinction between endowed and purchased status signaling; explains behaviors too readily dismissed as "irrational"; and reinterprets the results of a number of experiments in behavioral economics as artifacts of signaling rather than symptoms of cognitive deficiencies or moral concerns.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 46 working papers seriesDate posted: November 15, 1999Suggested CitationContact Information
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