Fiat Money’s Essentiality: A Result of Social Cooperation in a Competitive Economy
Shandong University - The Center for Economic Research
September 30, 2011
This paper mainly addresses why people are rationally willing to cooperate with one another to accept fiat money from the perspective of decentralized sequential general equilibrium framework by using dynamic game to determine agents’ expectation of nominal prices in unrevealed future. The model formulates the process that agents determine fiat money’s purchasing power competitively in an infinite-time decentralized sequence economy where agents use fiat money to bridge markets to avoid the huge transaction cost. It is proved that all agents’ expectation with fiat money’s unchanged nominal value is self-fulfilling with a Nash Equilibrium so as to guarantee fiat money’s essentiality.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 43
Keywords: fiat money’s essentiality, social cooperation, competitive economy
JEL Classification: C72, D51, E40working papers series
Date posted: September 30, 2011
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo2 in 0.531 seconds