Abstract

 


 



Decentralization and Governance


Jean-Paul Faguet


London School of Economics

June 2011

LSE STICERD Research Paper No. EOPP027

Abstract:     
The most important theoretical argument concerning decentralization is that it can improve governance by making government more accountable and responsive to the governed. Improving governance is also central to the motivations of real-world reformers, who bear risks and costs in the interest of devolution. But the literature has mostly focused instead on policy-relevant outcomes, such as education and health services, public investment, and fiscal deficits. This paper examines how decentralization affects governance, in particular how it might increase political competition, improve public accountability, reduce political instability, and impose incentive-compatible limits on government power, but also threaten fiscal sustainability.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 35

JEL Classification: C5, M5

working papers series


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Date posted: September 30, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Faguet, Jean-Paul, Decentralization and Governance (June 2011). LSE STICERD Research Paper No. EOPP027. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1935773

Contact Information

Jean-Paul Faguet (Contact Author)
London School of Economics ( email )
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+44 207 955 6435 (Phone)
+44 207 955 6844 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/destin/faguetjp.html
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