|
||||
|
||||
Decentralization and GovernanceJean-Paul FaguetLondon School of Economics June 2011 LSE STICERD Research Paper No. EOPP027 Abstract: The most important theoretical argument concerning decentralization is that it can improve governance by making government more accountable and responsive to the governed. Improving governance is also central to the motivations of real-world reformers, who bear risks and costs in the interest of devolution. But the literature has mostly focused instead on policy-relevant outcomes, such as education and health services, public investment, and fiscal deficits. This paper examines how decentralization affects governance, in particular how it might increase political competition, improve public accountability, reduce political instability, and impose incentive-compatible limits on government power, but also threaten fiscal sustainability.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 35 JEL Classification: C5, M5 working papers seriesDate posted: September 30, 2011Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
|||||||||
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
FAQ
Terms of Use
Privacy Policy
Copyright
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.406 seconds