Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1935907
 


 



Detection and Compliance in Cartel Policy


D. Daniel Sokol


University of Florida - Levin College of Law; George Washington University Law School Competition Law Center

September 30, 2011

CPI Antitrust Chronicle, Vol. 2, September 2011

Abstract:     
In the past few years, companies around the world have spent an increasing amount of resources addressing issues broadly classified as compliance. In the area of bribery there has been significant enforcement with strong financial and behavioral penalties under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA"). The United Kingdom has introduced a new anti-bribery regime this year, which has increased companies' awareness of the possible negative impact from breaking the law. Similarly, corporate governance legislative initiatives, such as Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank, have transformed the compliance landscape for many companies.

During this same period, there have been significant theoretical and empirical contributions as to the effects on a firm's performance of various corporate governance measures designed to reduce criminal behavior on the part of firms and individual managers. Quite a bit of this literature has focused on improved detection of wrong-doing. Given these changes, it is surprising that U.S. antitrust has not been on the cutting edge of compliance and detection. Antitrust's primary contribution has been the introduction of leniency programs around the world. In many ways leniency is effective in destabilizing existing cartels. However, it may be, in some cases, that leniency may actually strengthen certain cartels. Moreover, leniency may not be going after the right kinds of cartels - the worst offenders in terms of overcharges - and may instead be going after the cartels that are easy to find. Recent work suggests that the U.S. leniency program has not led to optimal deterrence.

If we take these critiques of leniency and cartel detection seriously (especially relative to detection of other types of corporate crimes) antitrust needs to come up with additional ways to promote cartel detection. This article focuses on some suggestions to improve detection and compliance for antitrust with regard to cartels.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 5

Keywords: antitrust, compliance, cartels, competition law, detection, corporate governance

JEL Classification: K21, L41, G30

Accepted Paper Series





Download This Paper

Date posted: October 3, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Sokol, D. Daniel, Detection and Compliance in Cartel Policy (September 30, 2011). CPI Antitrust Chronicle, Vol. 2, September 2011. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1935907

Contact Information

D. Daniel Sokol (Contact Author)
University of Florida - Levin College of Law ( email )
Spessard L. Holland Law Center
P.O. Box 117625
Gainesville, FL 32611-7625
United States
(352) 273-0968 (Phone)
(352) 392-3005 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.ufl.edu/faculty/d-daniel-sokol
George Washington University Law School Competition Law Center ( email )
200 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20052
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,803
Downloads: 306
Download Rank: 56,603
Paper comments
No comments have been made on this paper

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.500 seconds