Why Do We Resist Hard Incompatibilism? Thoughts on Freedom and Determinism
Michael Louis Corrado
University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - School of Law
October 1, 2011
in The Future of Punishment, ed. Thomas Nadelhoffer (Oxford 2013)
One of the most difficult challenges for the “hard incompatibilist” is to deal with the overwhelming objections to the therapeutic/incapacitative approach to crime control that seems to follow naturally from his theory. See, for example, Pereboom’s Living without Free Will, Chapter 6. Responding to this challenge requires the hard determinist (1) to find a way to distinguish between those who have traditionally been found responsible for their crimes and those who have been found not to be responsible; and (2) to justify the infliction of intentionally harsh treatment on at least some of those who fall into the first category. I attempt to develop a theory that satisfies both those requirements.
Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: October 2, 2011 ; Last revised: March 6, 2013
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