Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1937306
 
 

References (32)



 


 



Political Business Cycles: An Emergent-Dynamic Reformulation


Richard E. Wagner


George Mason University - Department of Economics

October 2, 2011

GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 11-41

Abstract:     
The literature on political business cycles follows two analytical conventions: (1) polity is reasonably reduced to a single agent who is either opportunistic or partisan and (2) economy is an equilibrated entity that is subject to politically inspired shocks. This paper pursues a different conceptualization of the relationship between politics and macro-level variability, and is based on three key differences from conventional formulations: (1) macro variables are not direct objects of choice but are just aggregates that emerge out of some micro structure of relationships, (2) a presumption that competitive processes are naturally turbulent replaces the standard focus on equilibrium states, and (3) polity and economy are treated not as point-mass entities but as an entangled ecology of enterprises. Within this alternative framework, variability is a normal feature of open competition, and with the intensity of that variability depending on the constitutional framework that governs the ecology of enterprises that comprise a political economy.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 27

Keywords: political business cycles, opportunistic cycles, partisan cycles, microfoundations, supervention, ecology of plans

JEL Classification: D72, E32, E61, H61

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: October 3, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Wagner, Richard E., Political Business Cycles: An Emergent-Dynamic Reformulation (October 2, 2011). GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 11-41. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1937306 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1937306

Contact Information

Richard E. Wagner (Contact Author)
George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )
4400 University Drive
334 Enterprise Hall
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
(703) 993-1132 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 330
Downloads: 65
Download Rank: 202,141
References:  32

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.625 seconds