Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1938045
 


 



Disciplinary Deficit: Crisis, Collaborative Regulation and Political Economies


Mark Findlay


University of Sydney - Faculty of Law; University of Sydney - Institute of Criminology; Singapore Management University - School of Law

October 3, 2011

Sydney Law School Research Paper No. 11/64

Abstract:     
The paper explores the features and charts the principle theorizing of regulatory sociability from collaboration rather than intervention, whatever the interest-based motivation within crisis, towards orderliness. It concludes with a discussion of disciplinary deficit, in terms of the way that compulsory regulatory preference remains low on the orderliness continuum. We argue that as compulsory discipline increases, it may produce compliance but at costs for regulatory sociability. The alternative regulatory paradigm is one which moves to resolve the antimony between desire and reason in a manner which relies on and endorses the constituents of collaboration.

Collaborative regulation, the paper suggests, can arise out of crisis and be justified through desires for orderliness without compulsion. But for collaborative regulation to be sustainable it must complement certain positive ‘orderly’ aspects within political economy. The analysis determines some observations concerning the shape and shaping of collaborative regulation in an atmosphere of more pluralist knowledge based (disciplinary) engagement.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23

Keywords: collaborative regulation, risk to ordering, sociability, global crisis, international regulatory networks

JEL Classification: K10, K30

Accepted Paper Series


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Date posted: October 4, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Findlay, Mark, Disciplinary Deficit: Crisis, Collaborative Regulation and Political Economies (October 3, 2011). Sydney Law School Research Paper No. 11/64. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1938045

Contact Information

Mark James Findlay (Contact Author)
University of Sydney - Faculty of Law ( email )
Faculty of Law Building, F10
The University of Sydney
Sydney, NSW 2006
Australia
University of Sydney - Institute of Criminology ( email )
Faculty of Law Building, F10
The University of Sydney
Sydney, NSW 2006
Australia
Singapore Management University - School of Law ( email )
60, Stamford Road
Level 4
Singapore, 178900
Singapore

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