|
|
|
|
||||
|
||||
Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete InformationDirk BergemannYale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics Stephen MorrisPrinceton University - Department of Economics October 10, 2011 Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1822 Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 024-2011 Abstract: We define a notion of correlated equilibrium for games with incomplete information in a general setting with finite players, finite actions, and finite states, which we call Bayes correlated equilibrium. The set of Bayes correlated equilibria of a fixed incomplete information game equals the set of probability distributions over actions, states and types that might arise in any Bayes Nash equilibrium where players observed additional information. We show that more information always shrinks the set of Bayes correlated equilibria.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 62 Keywords: Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure JEL Classification: C72, D82, D83 working papers seriesDate posted: October 10, 2011Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
FAQ
Terms of Use
Privacy Policy
Copyright
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.391 seconds
