CDS Auctions and Informative Biases in CDS Recovery Rates
New York University-Stern School of Business
Rangarajan K. Sundaram
New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance
April 1, 2012
Introduced in 2005 to identify recovery rates and so facilitate cash settlement in the multi-trillion dollar credit default swap market, credit-event auctions have a novel and complex two-stage structure that makes them distinct from other auction forms. Examining the efficacy of the auction's price-discovery process, we find that the auction price has a significant bias relative to pre- and post-auction market prices for the same instruments, and that volatility of market prices often increases after the auction. Nonetheless, we find that the auction generates information that is critical for post-auction market price formation. Auction outcomes are heavily influenced by strategic considerations and "winner's curse" concerns that could explain the observed biases. Structural estimation of the auction carried out under some simplifying assumptions suggests that alternative auction formats could reduce the bias in the auction final price.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 45working papers series
Date posted: October 13, 2011 ; Last revised: April 15, 2012
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.657 seconds