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Public Entrenchment Through Private Law: Binding Local Governments

Christopher Serkin

Vanderbilt Law School

September 1, 2011

University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 78, No. 879, 2011
Brooklyn Law School, Legal Studies Paper No. 260

Anti-entrenchment rules prevent governments from passing unrepealable legislation and ensure that subsequent governments are free to revisit the policy choices of the past. However, governments — and local governments in particular — have become increasingly adept at using private law mechanisms like contracts and property conveyances to make binding precommitments into the future. Simultaneously, courts and state legislatures in recent years have reduced the availability of core de-entrenching tools, like eminent domain, that have traditionally allowed governments to recapture policymaking authority from the past. These changes threaten to shift democratic power intertemporally. This Article develops a typology of mechanisms for public entrenchment through private law and private rights, as well as core anti-entrenchment protections embedded in the law. It then develops a framework for evaluating entrenchment concerns, comparing the costs of decreased flexibility against the benefits of increased reliance. Viewed through this framework, some recent changes in the law appear particularly problematic, from restrictions on eminent domain, to the rise of development rights, and creative forms of municipal finance like selling assets instead of incurring debt.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 87

Keywords: Local Government, Entrenchment, Private Law, Municipal Finance, Takings Clause

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Date posted: October 13, 2011 ; Last revised: February 15, 2012

Suggested Citation

Serkin, Christopher, Public Entrenchment Through Private Law: Binding Local Governments (September 1, 2011). University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 78, No. 879, 2011; Brooklyn Law School, Legal Studies Paper No. 260. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1942842

Contact Information

Christopher Serkin (Contact Author)
Vanderbilt Law School ( email )
131 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203
United States
615-343-6131 (Phone)
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