Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1943174
 
 

Footnotes (292)



 


 



Regulation for the Sake of Appearance


Adam M. Samaha


New York University School of Law

October 7, 2011

U of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 576
U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 364

Abstract:     
Appearance is often given as a justification for decisions, including government decisions, but the logic of appearance arguments is not well theorized. This Article develops a framework for understanding and evaluating appearance-based justifications for government decisions. First, working definitions are offered to distinguish appearance from reality. Next, certain relationships between appearance and reality are singled out for attention. Sometimes reality is insulated from appearance, sometimes appearance helps drive reality over time, and sometimes appearance and reality collapse from the outset. Finally, sets of normative questions are suggested based on the supposed relationship between appearance and reality for a given situation. These normative questions include aesthetics, transparency concerns, and the likelihood of a self-fulfilling prophecy. A final section applies these ideas to prominent debates over campaign finance regulation and broken windows policing. Leading empirical studies are examined and, throughout, the Article draws from scholarship in philosophy, sociology, psychology, economics, and political science.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 58

Keywords: appearance, expressivism, transparency, self-fulfilling prophecy, campaign finance regulation, broken windows policing, order maintenance policing

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: October 13, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Samaha, Adam M., Regulation for the Sake of Appearance (October 7, 2011). U of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 576; U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 364. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1943174 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1943174

Contact Information

Adam M. Samaha (Contact Author)
New York University School of Law ( email )
40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,306
Downloads: 273
Download Rank: 63,937
Footnotes:  292

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.219 seconds