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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1943648
 
 

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The Role of Firm Status in Appointments of Financial Experts to Audit Committees


David H. Erkens


University of Southern California - Leventhal School of Accounting

Sarah E. Bonner


University of Southern California

May 23, 2012

Accounting Review, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
Since 1999 regulators have attempted to improve the monitoring of financial reporting by exerting significant pressure on firms to appoint accounting financial experts (AFEs) to their audit committees. Yet, many firms have been reluctant to do so, which has made these firms more prone to financial reporting problems. We examine appointments of AFEs to the audit committees of S&P 1500 firms during the period 1999-2008 to explore whether concerns about the status of these experts discouraged firms from appointing them. We find that typical AFEs (CFOs and retired audit partners) have lower director status (board seats, trusteeships, social club memberships, and elite education) than other types of directors, and that this status gap is greater for higher status firms (larger, better connected, and more admired firms). Moreover, we find that higher status firms are less likely to appoint AFEs, suggesting that status-related concerns reduce the demand for accounting financial expertise on audit committees.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 50

Keywords: audit committees, financial experts, firm status, director status

JEL Classification: M41, G38

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Date posted: October 14, 2011 ; Last revised: May 26, 2012

Suggested Citation

Erkens, David H. and Bonner, Sarah E., The Role of Firm Status in Appointments of Financial Experts to Audit Committees (May 23, 2012). Accounting Review, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1943648 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1943648

Contact Information

David Hendrik Erkens (Contact Author)
University of Southern California - Leventhal School of Accounting ( email )
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0441
United States
(213)740-9318 (Phone)
Sarah E. Bonner
University of Southern California ( email )
Marshall School of Business
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0441
United States
213-740-5025 (Phone)
213-747-2815 (Fax)
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