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File name: SSRN-id2258498. ; Size: 471K
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New Dogs New Tricks: CEO Turnover, CEO-Related Factors, and Innovation Performance
Frederick L. Bereskin
University of Delaware
Po-Hsuan Hsu
National Chiao-Tung University - Institute of Management and Technology
April 30, 2013
Paris December 2011 Finance Meeting EUROFIDAI - AFFI
Abstract:
This paper examines how CEO turnover and CEO-related factors influence innovation. We find that CEO turnover is associated with a significantly greater quantity and quality of future innovation, measured with the number of patents, citations, patents per research and development dollar, and citations per patent in the subsequent three-year and five-year periods. New internal CEOs are associated with more and better innovation than new external CEOs. We also find that innovation quantity and quality are positively associated with CEO overconfidence, option compensation, and information asymmetries. These empirical results are robust to controlling for potential endogeneity issues and also remain in a sample of firms that experience the sudden deaths of their CEOs, confirming the critical role of CEOs in innovation performance.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 45
Keywords: Innovation, CEO turnover, Corporate governance
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Date posted: October 14, 2011
; Last revised: April 30, 2013
Suggested CitationBereskin, Frederick L. and Hsu, Po-Hsuan, New Dogs New Tricks: CEO Turnover, CEO-Related Factors, and Innovation Performance (April 30, 2013). Paris December 2011 Finance Meeting EUROFIDAI - AFFI. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1944047 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1944047
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