Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1944365
 


 



Provigil: A Case Study of Anticompetitive Behavior


Michael A. Carrier


Rutgers University School of Law - Camden

2011

Hastings Science & Technology Law Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 441-452, Summer 2011

Abstract:     
Using the sleep-disorder drug Provigil as a case study, this short symposium piece explores the anticompetitive harm presented by the combination of two distinct activities.

First, brand-name drug firms such as Cephalon, the developer of Provigil, have settled patent litigation by paying generic firms to delay entering the market. Second, brand firms, frequently at the end of a patent term, have engaged in "product hopping," switching from one means of administering a drug (e.g., tablet) to another (e.g., capsule).

The story of Provigil demonstrates the harm that can result from the combination of these two activities.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 12

Keywords: patent, antitrust, settlements, product hopping, drugs, Hatch Waxman, Provigil, Cephalon

JEL Classification: I18, K21, L40, L41, L43, L65, O34, O38

Accepted Paper Series





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Date posted: October 15, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Carrier, Michael A., Provigil: A Case Study of Anticompetitive Behavior (2011). Hastings Science & Technology Law Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 441-452, Summer 2011. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1944365

Contact Information

Michael A. Carrier (Contact Author)
Rutgers University School of Law - Camden ( email )
217 North Fifth Street
Camden, NJ 08102-1203
United States
856-225-6380 (Phone)
856-225-6516 (Fax)
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