Peer Punishment with Third-Party Approval in a Social Dilemma Game
Tilburg University - Department of Economics
Department of Economics, Monash University
October 1, 2011
Economics Letters, Vol. 117, 2012
Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2011-16
This paper investigates how punishment promotes cooperation when the punishment enforcer is independent of its proposer. In a prisoner’s dilemma experiment, compared with the case when the implicated parties are allowed to punish each other, cooperation is lower when the enforcement of punishment requires approval from an independent third party. Our data show that the independent third party mitigates the severity of punishment and consequently diminishes the effectiveness of punishment on promoting cooperation when antisocial punishment proposals are rare.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 3
Keywords: Social dilemmas, third party, punishment, cooperation, experiment
JEL Classification: C72, C92, D63
Date posted: October 17, 2011 ; Last revised: September 5, 2013
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