Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1945211
 
 

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Peer Punishment with Third-Party Approval in a Social Dilemma Game


Fangfang Tan


Tilburg University - Department of Economics

Erte Xiao


Carnegie Mellon University - Department of Social and Decision Sciences

October 1, 2011

Economics Letters, Vol. 117, 2012
Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2011-16

Abstract:     
This paper investigates how punishment promotes cooperation when the punishment enforcer is independent of its proposer. In a prisoner’s dilemma experiment, compared with the case when the implicated parties are allowed to punish each other, cooperation is lower when the enforcement of punishment requires approval from an independent third party. Our data show that the independent third party mitigates the severity of punishment and consequently diminishes the effectiveness of punishment on promoting cooperation when antisocial punishment proposals are rare.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 3

Keywords: Social dilemmas, third party, punishment, cooperation, experiment

JEL Classification: C72, C92, D63

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Date posted: October 17, 2011 ; Last revised: September 5, 2013

Suggested Citation

Tan, Fangfang and Xiao, Erte, Peer Punishment with Third-Party Approval in a Social Dilemma Game (October 1, 2011). Economics Letters, Vol. 117, 2012; Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2011-16. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1945211 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1945211

Contact Information

Fangfang Tan (Contact Author)
Tilburg University - Department of Economics ( email )
P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, DC 5000 LE
Netherlands
+49 89 24246 5252 (Phone)
+49 89 24246 5299 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.tax.mpg.de/en/pub/public_economics/public_economics_people/fangfang_tan.cfm
Erte Xiao
Carnegie Mellon University - Department of Social and Decision Sciences ( email )
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States
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