Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1946971
 
 

References (33)



 
 

Citations (21)



 


 



Organizing for Synergies


Luis Garicano


London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)

Wouter Dessein


Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics

Robert H. Gertner


University of Chicago - Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

November 2010

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 77-114, 2010
Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 11-32

Abstract:     
Large companies are usually organized into business units, yet some activities are almost always centralized in a company-wide functional unit. We first show that organizations endogenously create an incentive conflict between functional managers (who desire excessive standardization) and business-unit managers (who desire excessive local adaptation). We then study how the allocation of authority and tasks to functional and business-unit managers interacts with this endogenous incentive conflict. Our analysis generates testable implications for the likely success of mergers and for the organizational structure and incentives inside multidivisional firms.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 39

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: October 22, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Garicano, Luis and Dessein, Wouter and Gertner, Robert H., Organizing for Synergies (November 2010). American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 77-114, 2010 ; Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 11-32. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1946971

Contact Information

Luis Garicano
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )
Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
Wouter Dessein (Contact Author)
Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics ( email )
3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Robert H. Gertner
University of Chicago - Finance ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 317
Downloads: 100
Download Rank: 151,392
References:  33
Citations:  21

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.453 seconds