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Equity Issues with Time-Varying Asymmetric InformationRobert A. KorajczykNorthwestern University - Kellogg School of Management Deborah J. LucasNorthwestern University - Kellogg School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Robert L. McDonaldNorthwestern University - Kellogg School of Management October 1, 1991 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (JFQA), Vol. 27, No. 3, 1992 Abstract: This paper develops a formal model of the effect of time-varying asymmetric information on the timing and pricing of equity issues when managers are better informed than outside investors. We assume that as time passes, the adverse selection problem becomes more severe as more managers receive a private signal. Under this assumption, the model predicts temporal variation in the quantity of issues, with a bunching of issues after information releases. It also predicts that the price drop at issue announcement increases with the time since the last information release. These predictions are consistent with several recent empirical studies relating equity issues to earnings and dividend announcements.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 32 Keywords: Equity Issues, Adverse Selection, Asymmetric Information JEL Classification: G32 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: October 22, 2011Suggested CitationContact Information
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