Marriage with Labour Supply
Paris School of Economics (PSE); Université de Lorraine, BETA
Ecole Normale Superiéure (ENS) - Laboratoire d'Economie Theorique et Appliquee (LEA); National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) - Center for Research in Economics and Statistics (CREST); National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
September 1, 2011
We propose a search-matching model of the marriage market that extends Shimer and Smith (2000) to allow for labor supply. We characterize the steady-state equilibrium when exogenous divorce is the only source of risk. The estimated matching probabilities that can be derived from the steady-state flow conditions are strongly increasing in both male and female wages. We estimate that the share of marriage surplus appropriated by the man increases with his wage and that the share appropriated by the woman decreases with her wage. We find that leisure is an inferior good for men and a normal good for women.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 34
Keywords: marriage search model, collective labor supply, structural estimation
JEL Classification: C78, D83, J12, J22
Date posted: October 21, 2011
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