Institutions for Regulatory Cooperation in 'New Generation' Economic and Trade Agreements

Legal Issues of Economic Integration, Vol. 39, No. 1, pp. 109-126, 2012

22 Pages Posted: 22 Oct 2011 Last revised: 28 Jun 2013

See all articles by Debra P. Steger

Debra P. Steger

University of Ottawa - Common Law Section

Date Written: October 21, 2011

Abstract

There is not one, perfect model for institutional regulatory cooperation, nor is there a single model for eliminating technical barriers to trade or discriminatory sanitary and phytosanitary measures in a preferential trade agreement (PTA). However, recent experience with PTAs has shown that it is possible to progress beyond entirely separate regulation in specific sectors by each party with bilateral government committees that only meet once a year to joint committees that meet on a regular basis and engage in joint harmonization, rule-making, mutual recognition, and problem-solving. In a new generation PTA (either free trade agreement or customs union) in which economic integration is an agreed policy objective, joint institutions will be necessary to effectively implement harmonization of standards and development of joint standards codes as well as mutual recognition of technical regulations, standards and occupational qualifications.

Keywords: regulatory cooperation, trade agreements, non-tariff barriers, standards, technical regulations, SPS, TBT, preferential trade agreements, regional trade agreements

JEL Classification: F1, F4, K2, K3, L4

Suggested Citation

Steger, Debra P., Institutions for Regulatory Cooperation in 'New Generation' Economic and Trade Agreements (October 21, 2011). Legal Issues of Economic Integration, Vol. 39, No. 1, pp. 109-126, 2012, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1947421 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1947421

Debra P. Steger (Contact Author)

University of Ottawa - Common Law Section ( email )

57 Louis Pasteur Street
Ottawa, K1N 6N5
Canada

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