Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1951649
 
 

References (8)



 
 

Citations (12)



 


 



Is Mistrust Self-Fulfilling?


Ernesto Reuben


Columbia Business School - Management; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Paola Sapienza


Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Luigi Zingales


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); University of Chicago - Polsky Center for Entrepreneurship; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

2009

Economics Letters, Vol. 104, No. 2, pp. 89-91, 2009

Abstract:     
We study experimentally the effect of expectations on whether trust is repaid. Subjects respond with untrustworthy behavior if they see that little is expected of them. This suggests that guilt aversion plays an important role in the repayment of trust.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 8

Keywords: trust, trustworthiness, reciprocity, guilt aversion, experiment

JEL Classification: C72, C91, Z13

Accepted Paper Series


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Date posted: October 31, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Reuben, Ernesto and Sapienza, Paola and Zingales, Luigi, Is Mistrust Self-Fulfilling? (2009). Economics Letters, Vol. 104, No. 2, pp. 89-91, 2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1951649

Contact Information

Ernesto Reuben (Contact Author)
Columbia Business School - Management ( email )
3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
Paola Sapienza
Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management - Department of Finance ( email )
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
847-491-7436 (Phone)
847-491-5719 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Luigi Zingales
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-3196 (Phone)
773-834-2081 (Fax)

Chicago Booth School of Business Logo

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
University of Chicago - Polsky Center for Entrepreneurship
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Feedback to SSRN


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