Abstract

 


 



How Important is Capital Structure Policy to Firm Survival?


Y. Peter Chung


University of California at Riverside

Hyun Seung Na


City University of Hong Kong

Richard L. Smith


University of California, Riverside - Anderson Graduate School of Management

February 20, 2013


Abstract:     
If there is an economically important optimal capital structure, then firms that deviate too far from the optimum will face greater risk of failure or acquisition. Using data from the oil industry we find no significant evidence that capital structure policy affects acquisition or failure probability. Firms appear to increase leverage when they face attractive growth opportunities or when poor operating performance reduces equity value or compels borrowing. Firms are acquired when rapid growth has reduced financial slack. In a clinical examination, we address the question of how firms with persistently low leverage can operate and survive for many years without being targeted for acquisition. Our evidence supports the pecking-order hypothesis including acquisition among potential financing sources.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 48

Keywords: Capital structure, Bankruptcy, Acquisition, Oil exploration and development

JEL Classification: G32, G33, G34, L25, L71

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Date posted: November 2, 2011 ; Last revised: April 1, 2013

Suggested Citation

Chung, Y. Peter, Na, Hyun Seung and Smith, Richard L., How Important is Capital Structure Policy to Firm Survival? (February 20, 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1952199 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1952199

Contact Information

Y. Peter Chung
University of California at Riverside ( email )
Riverside, CA 92521
United States
909-787-3906 (Phone)
909-787-2933 (Fax)
Hyun Seung Na
City University of Hong Kong ( email )
Kowloon
Hong Kong
+852-3442 7927 (Phone)
Richard L. Smith (Contact Author)
University of California, Riverside - Anderson Graduate School of Management ( email )
Riverside, CA 92521
United States
951-827-3554 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.agsm.ucr.edu/
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