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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1954304
 
 

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The Nonemptiness of the Inner Core


Tomoki Inoue


Meiji University - School of Political Science and Economics

November 4, 2011


Abstract:     
We prove that if a non-transferable utility (NTU) game is balanced and if, at every individually rational efficient payoff vector, every non-zero normal vector to the set of payoff vectors feasible for the grand coalition is strictly positive, then the inner core is nonempty. The condition on normal vectors is satisfied if the set of payoff vectors feasible for the grand coalition is non-leveled. An NTU game generated by an exchange economy where every consumer has a continuous, concave, and strongly monotone utility function satisfies our sufficient condition.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 28

Keywords: inner core, inhibitive set, balancedness, NTU game

JEL Classification: C62, C71

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Date posted: November 5, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Inoue, Tomoki, The Nonemptiness of the Inner Core (November 4, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1954304 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1954304

Contact Information

Tomoki Inoue (Contact Author)
Meiji University - School of Political Science and Economics ( email )
1-1 Kanda-Surugadai
Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 101-8301
Japan
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