Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1954823
 
 

References (12)



 


 



When are Enhanced Relationship Tax Compliance Programs Mutually Beneficial?


Lisa De Simone


Stanford Graduate School of Business

Richard C. Sansing


Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business; CentER, Tilburg University

Jeri K. Seidman


University of Texas at Austin - McCombs School of Business

November 4, 2011

McCombs Research Paper Series No. ACC-07-11
Tuck School of Business Working Paper No. 2012-102

Abstract:     
This study investigates the circumstances under which “enhanced relationship” tax compliance programs are mutually beneficial to taxpayers and tax authorities, as well as how these benefits are shared. We develop a model of taxpayer and revenue authority behavior inside and outside of an enhanced relationship program. Our model suggests that, despite the adversarial nature of the relationship, an enhanced relationship program is mutually beneficial in many settings. The benefits are due to lower audit costs and the effect of taxpayer disclosures on the tax authority’s audit strategy. We also identify settings in which the program would decrease total expected tax compliance and audit costs, but these savings are not achieved because the program would make one party or the other worse off, and thus unwilling to enter the program.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30

Keywords: tax compliance, multinational taxation, game theory

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: November 5, 2011 ; Last revised: September 28, 2013

Suggested Citation

De Simone, Lisa and Sansing, Richard C. and Seidman, Jeri K., When are Enhanced Relationship Tax Compliance Programs Mutually Beneficial? (November 4, 2011). McCombs Research Paper Series No. ACC-07-11; Tuck School of Business Working Paper No. 2012-102. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1954823 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1954823

Contact Information

Lisa De Simone (Contact Author)
Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )
518 Memorial Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States
650-723-3874 (Phone)
650-724-3083 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/users/lnds

Richard C. Sansing
Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business ( email )
100 Tuck Hall
Hanover, NH 03755
United States
603-646-0392 (Phone)
603-646-1308 (Fax)
CentER, Tilburg University ( email )
P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
Jeri K. Seidman
University of Texas at Austin - McCombs School of Business ( email )
Austin, TX 78712
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 804
Downloads: 187
Download Rank: 92,708
References:  12

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo2 in 0.328 seconds