Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1955612
 
 

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Shaped by Booms and Busts: How the Economy Impacts CEO Careers and Management Styles


Antoinette Schoar


Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Luo Zuo


Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management

June 2, 2013


Abstract:     
We show that economic conditions when CEOs enter the labor market have lasting impact on their career paths and managerial styles. Recession CEOs take less time to become CEOs, but manage smaller firms, receive lower compensation, and move less across firms and industries. They also display more conservative styles: lower capital expenditures and R&D, less leverage, more diversification and lower overheads. These results do not seem to be driven by ex ante selection but by their labor-market experience. Recession experience at the time of labor force entry rather than during childhood explains most of the variation in management styles.

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Date posted: November 7, 2011 ; Last revised: June 3, 2013

Suggested Citation

Schoar, Antoinette and Zuo, Luo, Shaped by Booms and Busts: How the Economy Impacts CEO Careers and Management Styles (June 2, 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1955612 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1955612

Contact Information

Antoinette Schoar (Contact Author)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )
50 Memorial Drive, E52-447
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-3763 (Phone)
617-258-6855 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Luo Zuo
Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management ( email )
362 Sage Hall
Ithaca, NY 14853
United States
607-255-4002 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.johnson.cornell.edu/Faculty-And-Research/Profile.aspx?id=lz352

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