Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1956017
 
 

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Mandatory Long-Term Compensation in the Banking System -- And Beyond?


James C. Spindler


University of Texas School of Law

November 1, 2011

Regulation, Vol. 34, No. 3, p. 42, Fall 2011

Abstract:     
In the wake of the recent financial crisis, executive pay reformers are criticizing the policy of tying compensation to current firm performance. According to these reformers, this practice incentivized corporate managers to behave recklessly, which contributed to the crisis. Yet early last decade, in the wake of the Enron and MCI/WorldCom scandals, many of these same reformers argued that executive pay should be tied more closely to firm performance, to disincentivize questionable practices that came to light in the scandals. Now, these reformers say, pay should be tied to firm long-tem performance — that is, a large portion of a manager’s compensation should not be dispersed until long after the manager has left the firm. However, this proposal appears to suffer serious flaws, just as previous reform proposals did. This paper examines those flaws.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 7

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Date posted: November 7, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Spindler, James C., Mandatory Long-Term Compensation in the Banking System -- And Beyond? (November 1, 2011). Regulation, Vol. 34, No. 3, p. 42, Fall 2011. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1956017

Contact Information

James C. Spindler (Contact Author)
University of Texas School of Law ( email )
727 East Dean Keeton Street
Austin, TX 78705
United States
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