Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1956479
 
 

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Optimal Capital Structure and Regulatory Control


Carlos Pérez Montes


Bank of Spain

November 8, 2011

Banco de Espana Working Paper No. 1128

Abstract:     
This article studies how the managers of a regulated firm can use debt and equity contracts to constrain the regulator’s policy through the contingent transfer of control to external investors with high relative liquidation value. External finance increases regulated income and facilitates investment, but managers generally choose socially excessive levels of outside funds. If bankruptcy law favors reorganization over liquidation, the managers’ value of debt for a given investment level decreases. In the presence of income risk, regulatory ex ante commitment can increase the firm’s value if the regulator’s preference for continuation is high relative to that of managers.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 56

Keywords: Industrial regulation, capital structure, control rights, hold-up, bankruptcy

JEL Classification: L51, L52, G32, G33

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Date posted: November 8, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Pérez Montes, Carlos, Optimal Capital Structure and Regulatory Control (November 8, 2011). Banco de Espana Working Paper No. 1128. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1956479 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1956479

Contact Information

Carlos Pérez Montes (Contact Author)
Bank of Spain ( email )
Alcala 48
Madrid 28014
Spain
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