Rethinking Extraordinary Circumstances
University of California Hastings College of the Law
November 8, 2011
106 Northwestern University Law Review 377 (2012)
William & Mary Law School Research Paper No. 09-170
This short Essay seeks to rationalize the “extraordinary circumstances” requirement of Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the Supreme Court’s Ackermann decision, any extraordinary circumstances justifying relief must not have been caused by the movant’s own litigation conduct. I argue that the Ackermann rule, at its broadest, would be unjust to those litigants most in need of Rule 60(b)(6) relief and would overserve finality interests. A case study of the recent Fourth Circuit case Aikens v. Ingram illustrates these points. I propose, contrary to Aikens, that the Ackermann rule should apply more narrowly: only to a movant who intentionally abandons the litigation.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 10
Keywords: Ackermann, 60(b)(6), Rule 60, extraordinary circumstances, exceptional circumstances, aikens, relief from judgmentAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: November 9, 2011 ; Last revised: November 12, 2012
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo3 in 1.469 seconds