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Mathematical Structure of Voting Paradoxes: II. Positional VotingDonald G. SaariUniversity of California, Irvine - Department of Economics Economic Theory, Vol. 15, Issue 1, 2000 Abstract: A theory is developed to explain all positional voting outcomes that can result from a single but arbitrarily chosen profile. This includes all outcomes, paradoxes, and disagreements among positional procedure outcomes as well as all discrepancies in rankings as candidates are dropped or added. The theory explains why each outcome occurs while identifying all illustrating profiles. It is shown how to use this approach to derive properties of methods based on pairwise and positional voting outcomes. Pairwise voting is addressed in the preceding companion paper [15]; the theory for positional methods is developed here.
JEL Classification: D71 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: December 6, 1999Suggested CitationContact Information
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