Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=195769
 
 

Citations



 


 



Mathematical Structure of Voting Paradoxes: II. Positional Voting


Donald G. Saari


University of California, Irvine - Department of Economics


Economic Theory, Vol. 15, Issue 1, 2000

Abstract:     
A theory is developed to explain all positional voting outcomes that can result from a single but arbitrarily chosen profile. This includes all outcomes, paradoxes, and disagreements among positional procedure outcomes as well as all discrepancies in rankings as candidates are dropped or added. The theory explains why each outcome occurs while identifying all illustrating profiles. It is shown how to use this approach to derive properties of methods based on pairwise and positional voting outcomes. Pairwise voting is addressed in the preceding companion paper [15]; the theory for positional methods is developed here.

JEL Classification: D71

Accepted Paper Series


Not Available For Download

Date posted: December 6, 1999  

Suggested Citation

Saari, Donald G., Mathematical Structure of Voting Paradoxes: II. Positional Voting. Economic Theory, Vol. 15, Issue 1, 2000. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=195769

Contact Information

Donald G. Saari (Contact Author)
University of California, Irvine - Department of Economics ( email )
3151 Social Science Plaza
Irvine, CA 92697-5100
United States
(949) 824-5894 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,280

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.235 seconds