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Does Active Management Pay? New International Evidence


I. J. Alexander Dyck


University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management

Karl V. Lins


University of Utah - Department of Finance

Lukasz Pomorski


University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management

November 2011


Abstract:     
We hypothesize and find that the value of active management depends on characteristics of markets and investors. Using unique data, we focus on the performance of actual passive and active equity positions of an important category of institutional investors (defined benefit pension plans) from 1993 to 2008. After accounting for a variety of possible risk-based explanations, we conclude that in non-US equities there are no net costs to active positions and some evidence of benefits. In emerging markets, tests indicate significant active outperformance of 250 basis points per year. In EAFE markets, outperformance is around 50 basis points per year although in some of our tests this is not significantly different from zero. In more efficient US markets, consistent with prior studies, active positions underperform by the amount equal to the difference in active and passive costs. One implication of these patterns in returns is that plan managers will be more inclined to use active strategies in non-US markets. We test this implication and find that plans are the least active in US equities, more active in EAFE equities and the most active in emerging markets, and that these effects have become more pronounced over time.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 53

Keywords: international financial markets, investment management, emerging markets, active, passive, pension funds

JEL Classification: G11, G14, G15, G23

working papers series


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Date posted: November 11, 2011 ; Last revised: November 23, 2011

Suggested Citation

Dyck, I. J. Alexander, Lins, Karl V. and Pomorski, Lukasz, Does Active Management Pay? New International Evidence (November 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1957783 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1957783

Contact Information

I.J. Alexander Dyck
University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management ( email )
105 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3E6
Canada
416-946-0819 (Phone)
Karl V. Lins
University of Utah - Department of Finance ( email )
David Eccles School of Business
Salt Lake City, UT 84112
United States
801-585-3171 (Phone)
801-581-7214 (Fax)
Lukasz Pomorski (Contact Author)
University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management ( email )
105 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3E6
Canada
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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