Patent Disclosure in Standard Setting
University of Texas at Dallas - Managerial Economics; Boston University - Department of Economics
University of Mannheim - Department of Economics; Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)
NET Institute Working Paper No. 11-15
We present a model of industry standard setting with two-sided asymmetric information about the existence of intellectual property. We provide an equilibrium analysis of (a) firms' incentives to communicate ideas for improvements of an industry standard, and (b) firms' decisions to disclose the existence of intellectual property to other participants of the standardization process.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 48
Keywords: patent holdup, patent disclosure, standard setting organizations, industry standards, disclosure rules, conversation, asymmetric information, Bertrand competition
JEL Classification: D71, L15, O34
Date posted: November 24, 2011
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