Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=195934
 
 

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Congressional Vote Options


David C. King


Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS)

Richard J. Zeckhauser


Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

September 1999

NBER Working Paper No. w7342

Abstract:     
Among political practitioners, there is conventional wisdom about the outcomes of critical and salient legislative votes. 'This vote,' we hear, ' will either win by a little or lose by a lot.' Real-world examples suggest coalition leaders purchase 'hip-pocket' votes and "if you need me" pledges, which are converted to favorable votes when they will yield a victory. When the outcome is uncertain, such a process -- securing commitments in advance and calling them in if necessary -- is advantageous relative to traditional vote buying. Excess votes are not bought, nor are votes purchased for a losing effort. In effect, the leader secures options on votes. Given uncertainty, buying vote options yields two outcomes in conceivably winnable situations, one a narrow victory, the other a substantial loss. Such a distribution of outcomes is not explicable in a traditional vote-buying framework. We look for evidence of this pattern -- the tracings of 'if you need me pledges' -- by examining all Congressional Quarterly key votes from 1975 through 1998. On these critical and salient votes, narrow victories are much more frequent than narrow losses. Furthermore, when leaders lose key votes, as predicted, they lose by bigger margins than when they win. Finally, we discuss leadership strategies for keeping 'narrow wins' from unraveling into 'big losses.'

Number of Pages in PDF File: 41

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Date posted: February 16, 2000  

Suggested Citation

King, David C. and Zeckhauser, Richard J., Congressional Vote Options (September 1999). NBER Working Paper No. w7342. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=195934

Contact Information

David C. King (Contact Author)
Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) ( email )
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-1665 (Phone)
617-496-5960 (Fax)
Richard J. Zeckhauser
Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) ( email )
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-1174 (Phone)
617-384-9340 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-1174 (Phone)
617-496-3783 (Fax)
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