Legal Rights and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis: A Case Study
Charles L. Barzun
University of Virginia School of Law
November 14, 2011
Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2011-43
Legal philosophers divide over whether it is possible to analyze legal concepts without engaging in normative argument. The influential analysis of legal rights advanced by Jules Coleman and Jody Kraus some years ago serves as a useful case study to consider this issue because even some legal philosophers who are generally skeptical of the neutrality claims of conceptual analysts have concluded that Coleman and Kraus’s analysis manages to maintain such neutrality. But that analysis does depend in subtle but important ways on normative claims. Their argument assumes not only a positivist concept of law, but also that it counts in favor of an analysis of legal rights that it increases the number of options available to legal decisionmakers. Thus, whether Coleman and Kraus’s analysis is right in the end depends on whether those normative assumptions are justified. If even their analysis, which makes the thinnest of conceptual claims, depends on normative premises, that fact serves as strong evidence of the difficulty of analyzing legal concepts while remaining agnostic on moral and political questions.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 29
Keywords: Hart, Sacks, Legal Process, Pragmatism, Fuller, Jurisprudence, Jamesworking papers series
Date posted: November 15, 2011
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.454 seconds