Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1959403
 
 

References (30)



 


 



Legal Rights and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis: A Case Study


Charles L. Barzun


University of Virginia School of Law

November 14, 2011

Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2011-43

Abstract:     
Legal philosophers divide over whether it is possible to analyze legal concepts without engaging in normative argument. The influential analysis of legal rights advanced by Jules Coleman and Jody Kraus some years ago serves as a useful case study to consider this issue because even some legal philosophers who are generally skeptical of the neutrality claims of conceptual analysts have concluded that Coleman and Kraus’s analysis manages to maintain such neutrality. But that analysis does depend in subtle but important ways on normative claims. Their argument assumes not only a positivist concept of law, but also that it counts in favor of an analysis of legal rights that it increases the number of options available to legal decisionmakers. Thus, whether Coleman and Kraus’s analysis is right in the end depends on whether those normative assumptions are justified. If even their analysis, which makes the thinnest of conceptual claims, depends on normative premises, that fact serves as strong evidence of the difficulty of analyzing legal concepts while remaining agnostic on moral and political questions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 29

Keywords: Hart, Sacks, Legal Process, Pragmatism, Fuller, Jurisprudence, James

working papers series





Download This Paper

Date posted: November 15, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Barzun, Charles L., Legal Rights and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis: A Case Study (November 14, 2011). Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2011-43. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1959403 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1959403

Contact Information

Charles L. Barzun (Contact Author)
University of Virginia School of Law ( email )
580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
United States
434-924-6454 (Phone)

Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 980
Downloads: 209
Download Rank: 87,315
References:  30

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.312 seconds