Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1959523
 


 



Remedying a Lose-Lose Situation: How 'No Win, No Fee' Can Incentivize Post-Conviction Relief for the Wrongly Convicted


Elina Tetelbaum


Yale University - Law School

2010

Connecticut Public Interest Law Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2, p. 301, 2010

Abstract:     
This Article proposes a policy measure that will likely lead to an increase in exonerations by creating economic incentives for attorneys to represent clients post-conviction.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 42

Keywords: Contingent Fees, Exonerations, Wrongfully Convicted

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: November 15, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Tetelbaum, Elina, Remedying a Lose-Lose Situation: How 'No Win, No Fee' Can Incentivize Post-Conviction Relief for the Wrongly Convicted (2010). Connecticut Public Interest Law Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2, p. 301, 2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1959523

Contact Information

Elina Tetelbaum (Contact Author)
Yale University - Law School ( email )
P.O. Box 208215
New Haven, CT 06520-8215
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 197
Downloads: 32

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.265 seconds