Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1959613
 
 

References (33)



 
 

Citations (4)



 
 

Footnotes (2)



 


 



What Are We Meeting For? The Consequences of Private Meetings with Investors


David H. Solomon


University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business

Eugene F. Soltes


Harvard Business School

March 2015

Journal of Law and Economics, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
Using a unique dataset of all one-on-one meetings between senior management and investors for an NYSE-traded firm, we investigate the impact of these private meetings on investor decisions. We find evidence that investors who meet privately with management make more informed trading decisions in periods when they meet, increasing their position before periods of high returns and decreasing their positions before periods of low returns. This improved timing ability is concentrated in hedge funds, and does not appear to be driven by fixed investor skill, investors communicating with each other, or investors endogenously choosing to meet simply when they have pre-existing private information. The increase in timing ability is larger during periods of greater uncertainty and more public information availability, consistent with a mosaic theory of investing. Our results suggest that, despite the passage of Regulation Fair Disclosure, private meetings help a subset of investors make more informed trading decisions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 50


Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: November 16, 2011 ; Last revised: March 14, 2015

Suggested Citation

Solomon, David H. and Soltes, Eugene F., What Are We Meeting For? The Consequences of Private Meetings with Investors (March 2015). Journal of Law and Economics, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1959613 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1959613

Contact Information

David H. Solomon
University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business ( email )
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
Eugene F. Soltes (Contact Author)
Harvard Business School ( email )
Boston, MA 02163
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 4,492
Downloads: 1,086
Download Rank: 11,405
References:  33
Citations:  4
Footnotes:  2

© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.391 seconds