Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1961188
 
 

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Market Reactions to European Merger Regulation: A Reexamination of the Protectionism Hypothesis


Nihat Aktas


WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management

Eric De Bodt


Université Lille Nord de France - SKEMA Business School

Marieke Delanghe


Univ. Lille Nord de France - SKEMA Business School

Richard Roll


University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Finance Area

November 15, 2011


Abstract:     
In the 1990s, European merger regulation (EMR) was biased against foreign acquirers, especially if the deal harmed domestic rivals (i.e., protectionism). In 2002, the Court of First Instance overturned three prohibitions by the European Commission (EC) and criticized its economic analysis. These events hastened EMR reform, including amendments introduced in May 2004. With a sample of 474 merger proposals submitted to the EC during 1990–2007, we show that the EC’s protectionism from the 1990s did not extend into more recent periods. The change of policy toward foreign acquirers seems rooted in Court judgments of 2002 and subsequent regulatory reforms.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

Keywords: mergers and acquistions, regulation, protectionism

JEL Classification: G34, G38

working papers series


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Date posted: November 18, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Aktas, Nihat and de Bodt, Eric and Delanghe, Marieke and Roll, Richard, Market Reactions to European Merger Regulation: A Reexamination of the Protectionism Hypothesis (November 15, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1961188 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1961188

Contact Information

Nihat Aktas
WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management ( email )
Burgplatz 2
Vollender, 56179
Germany
Eric De Bodt
Université Lille Nord de France - SKEMA Business School ( email )
1 place Déliot, BP381
59020 Lille Cedex
France
+03 20 90 74 77 (Phone)
+03 20 90 77 02 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.edebodt.net
Marieke Delanghe (Contact Author)
Univ. Lille Nord de France - SKEMA Business School ( email )
Avenue Willy Brandt
Lille, 59777
France
Richard W. Roll
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Finance Area ( email )
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481
United States
310-825-6118 (Phone)
310-206-8404 (Fax)
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