Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1961225
 
 

Citations (6)



 
 

Footnotes (105)



 


 



What Really Matters in Spectrum Allocation Design


Thomas W. Hazlett


George Mason University Dept. of Economics and School of Law

Roberto E. Munoz


Universidad Tecnica Federico Santa Maria

Diego Bernardo Avanzini


Central Bank of Chile; George Mason University School of Law

October 27, 2011

Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property, Forthcoming
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 11-48

Abstract:     
Wireless license auctions have successfully replaced “beauty contests” in many countries. Competitive bidding (1) puts spectrum rights in the hands of the most productive firms; (2) reduces rent-seeking costs; and (3) captures license values for the public, potentially reducing costly tax distortions. Economists and policy makers have asymmetrically focused on (3). Yet, the overwhelming consumer welfare gains are produced in output (retail services) markets, not by extracting revenues from the sale of spectrum inputs. This fact leads to powerful policy implications, supporting liberal policies that permit market rivals to (quickly) access abundant bandwidth.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 48

Keywords: CMRS, CTIA, cellular, Connecting America, data services, FCC, Federal Communications Commission National Broadband Plan, IMF, International Monetary Fund, Internet, John McMillan, market inefficiencies, MOU, Milgrom, minutes of use, mobile telephone, networks, Paul Klemperer, text messages, web

JEL Classification: L96

Accepted Paper Series





Download This Paper

Date posted: November 17, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Hazlett, Thomas W. and Munoz, Roberto E. and Avanzini, Diego Bernardo, What Really Matters in Spectrum Allocation Design (October 27, 2011). Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property, Forthcoming; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 11-48. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1961225

Contact Information

Thomas W. Hazlett (Contact Author)
George Mason University Dept. of Economics and School of Law ( email )
George Mason School of Law
3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
703-993-4244 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://mason.gmu.edu/~thazlett/

George Mason Law School Logo

Roberto E. Munoz
Universidad Tecnica Federico Santa Maria ( email )
Avenue Spain 1680
Valparaiso Square 110
Chile
Diego Bernardo Avanzini
Central Bank of Chile ( email )
Agustinas 1180
Santiago
Chile
+56-2-670-2000 (Phone)
George Mason University School of Law ( email )
3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
(703) 993-8000 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 674
Downloads: 149
Download Rank: 117,094
Citations:  6
Footnotes:  105
Paper comments
No comments have been made on this paper

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.250 seconds