What Really Matters in Spectrum Allocation Design
Thomas W. Hazlett
Roberto E. Munoz
Universidad Tecnica Federico Santa Maria
Diego Bernardo Avanzini
Central Bank of Chile; George Mason University School of Law
October 27, 2011
Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property, Forthcoming
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 11-48
Wireless license auctions have successfully replaced “beauty contests” in many countries. Competitive bidding (1) puts spectrum rights in the hands of the most productive firms; (2) reduces rent-seeking costs; and (3) captures license values for the public, potentially reducing costly tax distortions. Economists and policy makers have asymmetrically focused on (3). Yet, the overwhelming consumer welfare gains are produced in output (retail services) markets, not by extracting revenues from the sale of spectrum inputs. This fact leads to powerful policy implications, supporting liberal policies that permit market rivals to (quickly) access abundant bandwidth.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 48
Keywords: CMRS, CTIA, cellular, Connecting America, data services, FCC, Federal Communications Commission National Broadband Plan, IMF, International Monetary Fund, Internet, John McMillan, market inefficiencies, MOU, Milgrom, minutes of use, mobile telephone, networks, Paul Klemperer, text messages, web
JEL Classification: L96
Date posted: November 17, 2011
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