Behavioral Antitrust and Monopolization
Maurice E. Stucke
University of Tennessee College of Law
November 17, 2011
Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Forthcoming
University of Tennessee Legal Studies Research Paper No. 171
One hot topic is whether Google has violated the antitrust laws. Another important topic is how behavioral economics can enrich antitrust policy. This Essay examines two implications of behavioral economics on antitrust monopolization law.
The Essay first discusses trial-and-error learning as an entry barrier. This is timely given the current debate over the entry barriers of the search engine market.
The Essay next discusses behavioral exploitation to maintain a monopoly. The behavioral economics literature can help explain the European Commission’s tying claims against Microsoft, why the Commission’s original remedy failed, and the benefits and risks of the Commission’s remedy involving its subsequent prosecution of Microsoft over Internet browsers.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 40
Keywords: behavioral economics, antitrust, tying, section 2, abuse of dominance, Sherman Act, entry barriers
JEL Classification: L12, L11, L40, L41, L63, D42Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: November 18, 2011 ; Last revised: October 30, 2012
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